An inventive step for the patent system? by Moir, Hazel V J
1 
An inventive step for the patent system? 
Hazel V J Moir
*
 
Centre for Policy Innovation 
The Australian National University 
Regulatory interventions can significantly restrict competition, damaging both business and 
consumers. Why then do governments use patents to attract additional resources into 
innovation? Why do they not leave it to the market to determine the best use of resources? 
The character of innovation that makes it different to other goods and services is that genuine 
innovation may produce spillover benefits from the embodied new knowledge. These 
spillovers can create benefits to other inventors and firms which may exceed the losses 
incurred by granting patents.  
A fundamental principle of good policy is that it should achieve its goals. In the case of 
patents this is to induce innovation than would not otherwise occur. The major focus in 
designing effective and efficient patent policy must therefore be on ensuring that patents are 
granted only for induced innovations and for induced innovations where there are sufficient 
spillover benefits to offset costs.1 It is therefore essential that patents are granted only for 
things that are a significant advance over what was then known. A low inventiveness 
requirement can impede other innovating firms, particularly where innovation is cumulative.2  
Spillover benefits 
The only reason to induce additional innovation investment is that the associated spillovers 
are thought to provide greater benefits to society than the losses flowing from the monopoly 
privilege. Externalities are notoriously difficult to measure, but where an invention provides 
new knowledge it has at least the possibility of providing benefits to other innovators and thus 
to society. Targeting new knowledge is thus an efficient means of focusing patent policy to 
achieve its goals. The inventive step operates as the fulcrum for balance in patent systems.  
Some analysts take the view that the publication of the knowledge in the invention is the quid 
pro quo for the public for the grant of the patent privilege. This ignores the fundamental 
economics of patent policy. It is the higher quantum of innovation, with its concomitant 
spillover benefits, that is the objective of and rationale for patent policy. If innovation did not 
have spillover benefits there would be no reason to intervene in this market. The social 
contract perspective also requires that there be some social value delivered from the patented 
invention.3 Publishing the specifications is simply a condition attached to the grant. It is 
theoretically4 a means by which the new knowledge enters the public domain, but it is the 
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new knowledge itself which is the quid pro quo for the public. The quantum of new 
knowledge demanded as the threshold for grant of a patent is therefore critical to ensuring that 
patent systems benefit a nation. 
Are the current procedures used to determine whether a patent application meets the 
inventiveness criterion for grant well designed to operate as this key balancing mechanism 
between the costs and benefits of patent systems?  
What is the actual height of the inventive step? 
We know from the existing literature that many very trivial patents are granted. In addition to 
serious analyses of data on legal outcomes,5 there has been amused public comment about 
such patents as swinging a swing sideways and IBM's patent for queuing for the toilet on an 
aeroplane.6 These examples can no longer be dismissed as aberrations. Speaking from a 
business perspective, Blonder advises that "much of what the [United States] Patent Office 
sees as invention is merely science applied to a new field by equation or analogy. At AT&T, 
we took old microwave patents and filed identical claims on optical inventions, which are also 
radio waves, only 10,000 times smaller. We were able to do this even though it was obvious 
to anyone who ever picked up a physics textbook that once you have the ability to make 
things smaller, the physics just translates over".7  
With respect to the European Patent Office (EPO) Pilch documents that it "is very difficult to 
prove that even the most trivial new idea does not contain an inventive step. The 2001 EPO 
Examination Guidelines even admonish examiners to be very critical of such proofs…"8 In 
their analysis of EPO software grants, Bakels and Hugenholtz reach a similar conclusion: 
"[t]he Examination Guidelines of the European Patent Office leave no doubt that the test of 
non-obviousness will present an obstacle to patentability only in exceptional cases.."9  
In a 2006 the UK Court of Appeal approved a four-step test on patentable subject matter 
proposed by the UK Patent Office. In considering this test the court refreshingly commented 
that it asked the examiner to construe the application to answer the central question "What has 
the inventor really added to human knowledge?"10 This comment is notable as one of the few 
occasions on which a judge in a patent decision referred to the new knowledge that should be 
at the heart of the patent system.11 
What is the current test? 
The first step in patent examination is to construe the patent application. This process centres 
on identifying the inventive contribution, though not in terms of what new knowledge is 
contributed. Rather it focuses on identifying the core 'inventive' concept then considering 
whether there is (allowed) documentary evidence to refuse grant on the basis that there is no 
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(trivial) difference from existing documented knowledge.12 At no time in the examination 
process is the applicant required to state clearly just what is added to human knowledge. 
In their search for a means of objectifying what is essentially a subjective question – 
sufficient inventiveness to merit a patent privilege – the courts have developed a series of 
rules which have reversed the core question. But "is it obvious?" gives a radically different 
answer to "is it inventive?" The asymmetry between these questions means "is it obvious?" 
has a much lower threshold for patent grant. Further, the ordinary meaning of the word 
obvious is not used in patent law.13 This departure from the normal legal practice of using 
words in their ordinary meanings also reduces the inventive step – "obvious" in patent law has 
an exceptionally narrow meaning. 
So patent offices and courts presume that if it is not obvious (in the very narrow patent law 
meaning) it must be inventive. This is like asking trying to determine if X is beautiful by 
determining if X is not ugly. If X is not ugly, then it must be beautiful. A clear fallacy.  
My empirical study of the inventiveness of a set of granted business method patents finds 
clear evidence of the impact of this reverse reasoning.14 For example the EPO, in considering 
whether to grant a patent for a software system scheduling delivery to an electronically locked 
box, found no documents 'teaching' both identifying a time interval for delivery and 
delivering only at that time.15 Had the reverse question been asked – what new knowledge is 
contributed in writing a computer program about scheduling deliveries, clearly the answer 
would have been "none." The EPO granted the patent.  
Another case is an 'invention' for secure transactions over the internet. The claims are for a 
software system for checking identity using encrypted fingerprints. Nothing in the claims 
concern the technicalities of encryption, it is simply treated as a data item, matched against a 
database. So the core of the invention is data input and checking. Clearly this contributed 
nothing to knowledge about either secure transactions or programming. At the USPTO the 
application was rejected nine times before a restriction to a sub-set of the invention achieved 
grant.16 During the correspondence the argument revolved around where the encrypted 
fingerprints were stored and whether this was 'taught' in existing documents. Such a trivial 
variation on the location of known systems is not what legislators had in mind when patent 
statutes were drafted.  
The closely similar parent of this 'invention' was granted a patent by the EPO, though first it 
was rejected as not technically inventive. Magically, when the words "wherein the stored 
fingerprint is in an encrypted format" were moved from claim 2 to claim 1, a patent was 
granted. This rearrangement of the claims does not change the nature of the 'invention' – that a 
data item is checked against a look-up table. Unfortunately EPO examiners are not required to 
provide reasons for granting a patent privilege, so it is hard to work out their reasoning.  
The other 70 cases in the dataset all provide examples of how the approach taken in the 
current legal definition of inventiveness acts to allow the grant of thousands of 'inventions' 
that are mere trivial variations of known processes and artefacts. The fact that it is the patent 
office which has to disprove 'inventiveness' rather than the applicant having to prove it;17 the 
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ability to endlessly amend applications, the focus on semantics not substance, the minimal 
difference that masquerades as 'inventiveness' all add up to a system which does not meet the 
core policy objective. The patent system approach to defining inventiveness in no way limits 
grant to those inventions which provide genuine contributions to knowledge. While none of 
the 72 cases involve any contributions to knowledge, two contain possibly new ideas, 
expressed at such a broad level of generality that no new knowledge is conveyed.18 
Taking steps to re-balance the patent system 
Could the patent system be reformed by replacing the current plethora of rules around the 
inventive step with a test for a reasonable contribution to knowledge? While defining 
"reasonable" requires some thought, the system as it presently operates does not require any 
new knowledge. Patents are granted simply for minor re-arrangements of old knowledge. This 
provides no spillover benefits. Combining an "is there new knowledge" test with genuine 
workshop modification/variation and analogous use doctrines might provide at least some 
chance that granted patents provide spillover benefits. 
What would happen if the test to was reformed in this way? First, the number of patent grants 
(and applications) would fall dramatically – by thousands in smaller countries such as 
Australia and by tens of thousands in Europe and the USA. Over time this would reduce the 
patent thickets faced by innovating firms.19 If the proposed change in standard eliminated 
even half the current grants this would clean out nearly 150,000 dubious patent grants a year 
across these four offices. If the change in standards cut out 75 per cent of grants then the 
volume of granted monopolies would drop from nearly 300,000 to around 75,000. This is still 
a remarkable number of monopolies granted each year. Indeed if one stops to think about 
inventiveness, such very large volumes of patents directly imply an extremely low inventive 
step, even given the vast achievements of modern technology. 
Falls of these magnitudes would substantially reduce noise in the system, making patent 
search far cheaper and more efficient. As others have noted, fewer higher quality patents 
would have more positive effect on innovation and fewer negative impacts on competition.20 
The major beneficiaries would be innovating firms, particularly in those industries where 
“truckloads of patents” need to be exchanged for firms to use each other’s complementary and 
overlapping technologies, effectively allowing these firms to proceed as if the patent system 
did not exist. The proposed change in the test for inventiveness would have no effect on 
genuine inventions – these would have no trouble passing the test and gaining patents. There 
should therefore be no impact on the overall level of innovation.  
The costs of acquiring patents would fall substantially, because unnecessary patents would no 
longer be sought. And herein lies the difficulty in achieving this change – with so many fewer 
patent applications, there would be a need for far fewer patent attorneys. The greatest 
objections to this proposal would therefore come from the well-organised patent attorney 
profession. The pharmaceutical industry would probably also object as it uses myriad low-
quality applications to extend the life of patents for genuine inventions.21  
Despite the challenges posed by these sectional interests, nations would be well advised to 
review and lift the inventive step in their patent systems before international trade 
negotiations prevent them doing so. Sectional interests have already succeeded in having 
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TRIPS-plus limitations on inventiveness written into a number of "free trade" treaties. The 
draft of the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement provides that: 
"patents shall be available for any new forms, uses, or methods of using a known 
product; and a new form, use, or method of using a known product may satisfy the 
criteria for patentability, even if such invention does not result in the enhancement of 
the known efficacy of that product." (Article 8.1)22 
This is clearly directed at preventing nations from experimenting with new approaches to 
define a balanced height to the inventive step. The wording suggests a particular target is 
India, with its requirement that patents can be granted for pharmaceutical products only where 
these provide an increase in efficacy.23 The Indian approach seems entirely reasonable – why 
should society grant a monopoly for a product that does not provide an improved outcome, 
especially in the very important area of health care. As Drahos has commented: 
"… drugs that have … a combination of left and right hand molecular structures are 
being re-patented by pharmaceutical companies as either left or right-handed drugs. The 
real question that society wants an answer to is not whether this is inventive as a matter 
of patent law jurisprudence, a jurisprudence that has been paid for by decades of 
pharmaceutical company litigation, but rather whether it is innovative as judged by the 
community of experimental pharmacologists, a community which tends to look for 
genuine leaps in therapeutic benefits rather than clever marketing strategies."24 
National freedom to determine the height of the inventive step is critical to ensuring that such 
monopoly systems act to benefit the nation as a whole rather than selected companies. It is 
clear that the body of case law defining the inventive step has driven the standard far too low. 
Given the importance of innovation and innovative companies to national economic well-
being it is essential that nations take action as soon as possible to re-introduce a genuine 
inventiveness requirement into their patent systems. 
In 2003 the US Federal Trade Commission concluded that there was a "plethora of 
presumptions and procedures [which] tip the scales in favor of the ultimate issuance of a 
patent, once an application has been filed."25 In the intervening decade there has been no 
evidence of any action to address this critical issue in any major jurisdiction. When the vast 
economies of India and China start producing tens or hundreds of thousands of patent 
applications a year we may regret our failure to take action to restore balance to the patent 
system.  
                                                          
22
 While this treaty is being negotiated in secret, a leaked version is available at 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf (accessed 11 November 2012). 
23
 B. N. Sampat, K. C. Shadlen and T. M. Amin, "Challenges to India's pharmaceutical patent laws" (2012) 337 
(27 July 2012) Science 414-415. 
24
 P. Drahos, "Patent reform for innovation and risk management: a separation of powers approach" (2007) 1 
Knowledge Ecology Studies (KEStudies) at 6. 
25
 Federal Trade Commission (US), To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law 
and Policy (2003) at 8. 
